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1 INTRODUCTION 
The idea of the thesis is to describe different cognitive biases that are associated with 
investor behavior and the harmfulness of these biases on the rationality of investment 
decisions. The focus of the thesis is not on professional investors, but on everyday 
people and their thought processes, as they are making investment decisions. In 
investing, there are winners and losers, and the thesis will introduce some of the most 
common biases that affect rational decision-making, and evidently result in more or 
less irrational investment decisions. 
Before discussing different forms of irrational investment behavior, it is important to 
understand rational decision-making and the different factors that need to be taken into 
account while making rational investment decisions. The thesis will first define some 
of the key factors that are necessary for rational investment decisions to take place. 
This includes understanding the possibilities and risks that are associated with making 
different investment decisions. Due to the fact that the thesis focuses on describing the 
thought processes of amateur investors as well as the possible flaws that may occur in 
their decision-making, the thesis will only introduce the simplest asset pricing models 
that help in making rational investment decisions. 
After determining the different factors, which is necessary to understand to make 
rational investment decisions, the thesis will discuss the different fallacies and 
cognitive biases that negatively affect the rationality of investment decisions. These 
biases have a tendency of causing an illusion of validity (Fisher & Statman, 2000, 72); 
they make people believe that their thought process is rational when, in fact, it is not. 
Several studies of these biases and their negative effects on investment decisions have 
been done previously, examples and conclusions of which will be discussed later on 
in the thesis. 
The thesis will ultimately attempt to answer the question “Why do cognitive biases 
occur in investing?”. Additional questions that the thesis will try to answer are “What 
kinds of cognitive biases do investors face?” and “What can investors do to avoid 
cognitive biases?” The purpose of the thesis is to provide information especially to 
amateur investors about the possible cognitive biases that might occur in their 
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investment decisions without them noticing. By exposing some of the most common 
flaws of investor behavior the thesis attempts to help investors recognize and eliminate 
the irrationalities in their decision-making processes. 
The second chapter of this thesis will introduce the concept of rationality, describe 
investment risk and how it differs in different financial markets, as well as define and 
describe the efficient market hypothesis. The third chapter will define and elaborate 
different kinds of heuristics and cognitive biases that constantly affect rational 
decision-making and cause a spiral of irrational behavior. The fourth chapter will 
further explain different cognitive biases and their occurrence investing, as well as 
how investors can be susceptible to many cognitive biases at once in certain kinds of 
situations. The fifth chapter draws conclusions based on the first four chapters, as well 











2 RATIONAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
This chapter will introduce the terms that need to be taken into account when making 
investment decisions. The chapter will first introduce the term of rationality because 
in order to make rational investment decisions it is important to grasp on what it means 
to act rationally. Next, the chapter will define and explain the meaning and significance 
of investment risk because it is necessary to understand that different securities have 
different amounts of risk associated with them. Further on, the chapter will introduce 
a term called the efficient market hypothesis. It is vital for an investor to understand, 
and it will also help in comprehending the causes of the different cognitive biases that 
will be introduced and explained in the third chapter of this thesis. 
2.1 Rationality 
People have found defining rationality a difficult task, as it has been under a lot of 
debate. However, it has been generally agreed that acting rationally and making 
rational decisions should obey some rules of consistency and coherence. (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981) Human beings, however, act according to what is known as bounded 
rationality in the presence of uncertainty and imperfect competition. When rationality 
is bounded, it is lacking omniscience. (Simon, 1979) This means that the existence of 
asymmetrical information, unequal opportunity and uncertainty of outcomes result in 
irrational behavior at least to some extent, as people do not know “everything about 
everything”. 
Even experienced researchers can make irrational decisions if they act according to 
their intuition (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This implies that acting according to 
one’s intuition is bound to be an act of irrational behavior. The third chapter of the 
thesis will introduce what are known as heuristics and cognitive biases that have been 
proven to underlie irrational behavior and bounded rationality. 
2.2 Investment Risk 
Investors have the possibility of investing on four different kinds of markets: the 
money market, the securities market, the foreign exchange market and the derivatives 
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market. The money market deals with short-term securities and the transfer of funds 
with a maximum term to maturity of one year. The other three markets belong to the 
capital market, which deals with long-term securities and the transfer of funds of 
securities with a term to maturity of over one year. (Pilbeam, 2010, 33, 35.) All of the 
markets have different kinds and varying amounts of risk associated with them. 
2.2.1 Money Market 
The money market is a part of the fixed-income market. Short-term debt securities are 
traded on the money market. A large portion of these securities is traded in great 
quantities, so they are not available to individual investors. Small investors, however, 
have the possibility of investing in money market funds that purchase various money 
market securities on behalf of these investors. Examples of these securities are 
Treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers. (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 
2014, 29–30.) 
Treasury bills (T-bills) are more marketable than any other money market instrument. 
T-bills are offered to the public by the government with the purpose to raise money. 
T-bills have a maturity value that is paid back to the investors at their maturity date. 
The profit made by investors comes from the fact that the government sells T-bills to 
the public at a discount from the maturity value. T-bills are known to be easily 
converted to cash and sold at low transaction cost, as well as having little price risk. 
What additionally makes them attractive to investors is the fact that profits from T-
bills are not subject to tax deductions. (Bodie et al., 2014, 29.)  
Certificates of deposit (CDs) can basically be defined as bank deposits that have a 
certain fixed date when the deposit is returned to the depositor or investor. A deposit 
cannot be withdrawn from the bank on demand. The bank pays the depositor the 
principle sum plus interest only at the end of the fixed term. However, CDs that are 
issued with a greater face value than 100 000 dollars can be negotiated to be sold to 
another investor if the holder of the CD needs to convert the CD into cash before its 
date of maturity. Short-term CDs are typically highly marketable, but the market 
becomes remarkably smaller when the maturity of CDs is over three months. (Bodie 
et al., 2014, 30.) The risks that are associated with CDs can be considered fairly 
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minimal taking into account that CDs with a face value of over 100 000 dollars can be 
possibly sold on. 
Commercial papers are unsecured short-term debt notes issued by large, significant 
companies that are known to the general public. It is very common that commercial 
papers grant investors with a line of credit that they can use to pay off the commercial 
paper if necessary. Commercial papers have a maturity of up to 270 days, although 
they typically have a maturity of under one or two months. Small investors can only 
invest in commercial papers via money market mutual funds because commercial 
papers are commonly issued in multiples of 100 000 dollars. Investing in these 
securities is typically considered to be relatively safe, as a maturity of only one month 
allows the condition of a firm to be monitored and predicted over such a short period 
of time. However, assets-backed commercial papers issued by financial firms such as 
banks were some years ago used to raise capital for these financial institutions to invest 
in other kinds of securities, such as subprime mortgages. The issuing of these kinds of 
commercial papers caused a chain of events that ultimately led to the financial crisis 
of 2008. (Bodie et al., 2014, 30–31.) 
It is important to understand that money market securities, despite having low risk, are 
not risk-free. T-bills have the lowest risk as well as the lowest yield of all money 
market securities, and the risk associated with them is fairly minimal. However, the 
other money market instruments have a higher yield than T-bills to compensate for the 
higher risk that investors have to bear when holding these riskier securities. (Bodie et 
al., 2014, 32.) 
2.2.2 Securities Market 
The amount of risk that is associated with making an investment on the securities 
market depends on the kind of financial securities that are being invested in. A 
financial security can be defined as a legal claim to a future cash flow. A financial 
security has an issuer who gives the legal ownership of the financial security to an 
investor in exchange for the amount of cash that the financial security is worth. The 
issuer of the financial security agrees to make future cash payments to the investor as 
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a compensation for the risk the investor is bearing for owning the financial security. 
(Pilbeam, 2010, 28-29.)  
The risk on a financial security can basically be defined as the probability that the 
actual return of the security will be lower than its expected return. In the securities 
market, investors can choose to invest in either stocks or bonds; that is, in equity or 
debt securities. The former of the securities have more risk associated to them as the 
latter because the rate of interest that bond holders receive is usually fixed, whereas 
the expected rate of return on stocks is more uncertain. (Pilbeam, 2010, 156.) 
Debt securities are traded in the bond market. These securities differ from money 
market securities in the sense that these debt securities have a term to maturity of over 
one year, whereas money market securities only deal with securities with a maturity 
of up to one year. Securities that are included in the bond market are, for example, 
Treasury notes and bonds, corporate bonds and mortgage securities. (Bodie et al., 
2014, 34.)  
Treasury notes and bonds are long-term debt securities issued by the government. They 
differ from each other in their maturity times; T-notes have a term to maturity of up to 
10 years, whereas the maturity of T-bonds ranges from 10-30 years. In the US, both 
securities can be issued at a face value of 100 dollars, but typically both securities are 
issued in increments of 1000 dollars. Both securities make coupon payments, which 
are basically payments of interest that are paid semiannually to the holders of these 
securities. The least risky Treasury bonds are called inflation-protected Treasury 
bonds, which are linked to an index of the cost of living. This kind of a Treasury bond 
is employed in many countries around the world, and the point of it is to provide the 
citizens of a country an effective way to reduce the risk caused by inflation. (Bodie et 
al., 2014, 34–35.) 
Corporate bonds are issued by private companies with the purpose of raising capital 
for their operations. Similar to Treasury bonds and notes, corporate bonds make 
semiannual coupon payments to investors during their term to maturity, and the face 
value is return to the bondholders at maturity. However, the risk related to corporate 
bonds is significantly higher than the risk associated with T-bonds and notes. 
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Corporate bonds have the risk of the bond issuer going bankrupt, which can result in 
bondholders losing their entire investment. Corporate bonds can also have different 
options attached to them, which will be described later on in this chapter. (Bodie et al., 
2014, 39.) 
The value of a bond can be estimated by using bond-valuation models. A simple model 
that is commonly used is presented in the following formula: 
,   (1) 
where 
C = coupon payment 
i = yield to maturity 
n = term to maturity 
M = face value of bond 
The coupon payment is the interest payment that the bondholder receives, for example, 
annually until the bond matures. Yield to maturity is the percentage of interest that the 
bondholder receives, for example, annually until the maturity date of the bond. Term 
to maturity is the number of, for example, years until the bond matures. The face value 
of a bond is the amount of money that the bondholder has invested in the bond when 
buying it. 
The rapid expansion of mortgage-backed securities has led to the majority of people 
having the opportunity of investing in a mortgage loan portfolio. Resultingly, 
mortgage loans are a significant part of the fixed-income market today. These kinds of 
securities can be defined as a right to own a pool of mortgages or an obligation that is 
secured by a mortgage pool. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, subprime mortgages, 
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which are loans offered to financially weaker borrowers with higher risk, were a major 
component in the happening of the financial crisis in 2008, during which banks, hedge 
funds and other investors, as well as people who were holders of subprime mortgage 
securities ended up making huge financial losses. After the financial crisis, people are 
likely to be more careful regarding the securitization, that is, turning for example a 
mortgage loan into a security because of the potential risks of such practice, the worst 
possible outcome of which was demonstrated in the financial crisis. (Bodie et al., 2014, 
39–40.) 
Common stocks, also known as equity securities, of most large companies are usually 
traded freely on at least one stock exchange. Owning shares of a stock means that the 
shareholder owns a part of the company, the shares of which they hold. Every 
shareholder has the right to participate in annual meetings and vote on issues related 
to the governance of the company. Sometimes, however, a company can issue two 
kinds of common stock, of which the first one entitles the shareholder a vote, while 
the other does not. This might result in the nonvoting stock having a cheaper price than 
the voting stock. Shareholders also elect the board of directors for the company, and 
the board chooses managers to run the company. The board oversees the management 
of the firm in order to make sure that the management is acting in such a way that is 
in the best interest of the shareholders. (Bodie et al., 2014, 41–42.)  
The investment risks that are associated with investing in common stock have to do 
with residual claim and limited liability.  Residual claim means that shareholders will 
be paid last if the assets of the company are liquidated. The risk in this is in the fact 
that the company may not necessarily have enough assets to pay back all of the money 
that the it owes, and so, as the shareholders are last in line, shareholders might not be 
able to get their money back. Limited liability means that the most a shareholder can 
lose if the company goes bankrupt is their original investment, but they are not 
personally responsible for the firm’s obligations. (Bodie et al., 2014, 42)  
2.2.3 Derivatives Market 
The derivatives market has experienced significant growth in recent years. The values 
of derivatives are based on the values of other financial securities, such as stocks, 
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bonds or market index values. Examples of derivatives, or derivative securities, are 
options and futures contracts. (Bodie et al., 2014, 51)  
There are two kinds of options, call options and put options. A call option gives an 
investor the possibility to purchase, for example, shares of stock for a certain 
predetermined price on or before the expiration date of the option. The idea of the 
option is that the investor could purchase a certain number of shares of stock for a 
price that is lower than the market value of the stock. (Bodie et al., 2014, 51) For 
example, if an investor has an option to purchase shares of stock of a company for 150 
US dollars it would be profitable for the investor to use the call option if the market 
value of the stock decreases to under 150 US dollars. 
A put option gives an investor the right to sell, for example, shares of stock for a 
predetermined price on or before the expiration date of the option. The point of a put 
option is similar to a call option in the sense that it is rational for an investor to use the 
put option if the market value of the security that the option is attached to increases 
above the predetermined price of the option. (Bodie et al., 2014, 51) For example, if 
the predetermined price of the put option is 150 US dollars it is rational for the investor 
to use the option if the market value of the stock increases above 150 US dollars. 
A futures contract calls that an investor will buy a security from another investor at a 
specified price at a specified date in the future. The contract can benefit either one of 
the investors, depending on what happens to the market price of the security in between 
the date of making the futures contract and the date on which the security is delivered. 
The buyer benefits from the contract if the specified price is lower than market price 
of the security when the trade is made, and the seller makes a profit on the contract if 
the specified price is higher than the market price of the security when the trade is 
made. (Bodie et al., 2014, 53) For example, if the specified price of the futures contract 
is 50 US dollars the buyer benefits from the trade at the specified date if the market 
price of the security is higher than 50 US dollars when the trade is made, and the seller 
benefits from the contract if the market price is lower than 50 US dollars when the 
trade is made. This implies that the risk in futures contracts is in the uncertainty, 
whether the market price of the security will increase or decrease in between the date 
of making the contract and the date of making the trade. 
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2.2.4 Market Indexes and Indicators 
Stock market indexes are basically large portfolios of significant companies, the 
purpose of which is to describe the performance of the national stock market as a 
whole. Some of the most significant stock market indexes world-wide are the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average in the US, the Nikkei Average of Tokyo in Japan and the 
Financial Times index of London in Great Britain. Each of the above-mentioned 
market indexes measure the performance of the stock market in their own country. 
(Bodie et al., 2014, 44) 
Bond market indicators have the same logic as stock market indexes, as there are 
several indicators that attempt to describe the performance of different kinds of bonds. 
The three groups of bond market indexes that are most well-known are Merrill Lynch, 
Barclays and Salomon Smith Barney (which is now a part of Citigroup). Bond market 
indexes are, however, traded somewhat infrequently, which means that it is difficult 
to compute accurate rates of return on many bonds. (Bodie et al., 2014, 50) In other 
words, the risk that is associated with investing in bond market indexes comes from 
the fact that the computed rates of return on many bonds do not provide very accurate 
results. This implies that some bond prices have to be estimated in practice by using 
bond-valuation models. 
2.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that capital markets that are well-
organized are efficient markets. The EMH argues that although inefficiencies might 
exist in well-organized capital markets they occur only seldom and are rather 
insignificant. (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2008, 391) Another way to describe the 
EMH was proposed by Fama (1970) who defined the EMH as the hypothesis that 
security prices fully reflect all available information. The idea behind both definitions 
is that capital markets will ultimately organize themselves in such a manner that 
investors will find it hard to make abnormal returns. 
The efficient markets theory was first proposed in 1900 by the French mathematician 
Louis Bachelier in his PhD thesis “The Theory of Speculation”, in which he discussed 
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the price changes of stocks and commodities and how the prices seemed equivalent in 
different situations (Bachelier, 1900). However, Bachelier’s theory was similar to the 
random walk theory proposed by Jules Regnault in his book from 1863, “Calculation 
of the Chance and Philosophy of the Stock Market” (Regnault, 1863), which poses a 
question, whether Bachelier based his theory on the work of Regnault. 
The most significant contribution to the EMH, however, was made by Eugene Fama 
(1970), who stated that it is impossible for investors to buy underpriced securities or 
sell overpriced securities. Fama used three different kinds of tests to underpin the 
validity of the EMH: weak form tests, semi-strong form tests and strong form tests. 
The three kinds of tests took different factors into account, and all of them showed 
results that supported the EMH. 
Many investors use most of their time trying to find mispriced stocks; that is, stocks 
the price of which is lower or higher than it should be. These investors analyze 
different companies thoroughly in order to find stocks the price of which does not 
correlate correctly with how well the company is doing. The number of investors 
operating this way is significant, which results in competition between these kinds of 
investors. The competition among these investors means that the number of mispriced 
stocks on the market decreases all the time. In other words, the price of stocks on the 
market approaches their actual and correct price, and this implies that the markets are 
becoming correctly priced. As the definition of an efficient market is that investors pay 
the exact price that the stocks are worth and the companies receive the exact amount 
of capital that their stocks are worth, the competition among investors who search for 
mispriced stocks will ultimately result in the markets becoming efficient. (Ross et al., 
2008, 391)  
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3 COGNITIVE BIASES IN INVESTING 
For the sake of simplicity, investors are assumed to always act and behave rationally 
while making investment decisions. However, the development of behavioral finance 
has enabled the identification of various fallacies, known as cognitive biases, that can 
harm the rational behavior of investors. Studies have shown that investors are 
continuously susceptible to these cognitive biases that have negative effects on the 
rationality of their investment decisions. Investors, in fact, often act according to one 
or more cognitive biases without them even recognizing the irrationalities in their 
investment behavior. 
This chapter will introduce some of the most common cognitive biases that affect 
rational decision-making, the recognition and understanding of which can help 
investors in preventing the susceptibility to not only the cognitive biases but also the 
heuristics which lead to them. The chapter will first introduce some of the most 
common heuristics that affect rational investment behavior. The chapter will then go 
on to describe the concept of prospect theory that describes the fallacious attitudes of 
investors on investment risk, as well as some of the most significant cognitive biases 
that affect investors’ decision-making. 
3.1 Heuristics 
People have a tendency of assessing probabilities of outcomes of uncertain situations 
by relying on various non-scientific principles or rules of thumb. These principles are 
not based on facts or statistics, but rather on individual beliefs and assumptions 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In other words, people think that an uncertain situation 
most probably has a certain kind of outcome because they base their assessment on 
their own assumptions that, in fact, have no scientific or statistical proof or basis. These 
beliefs and assumptions that people use to evaluate and decide upon the outcomes or 
results of uncertain situations are called heuristics. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) presented three heuristics that people use to make 
decisions and judgements in uncertain situations. The first of these is 
representativeness, which people often use when they are asked to assess, for example, 
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the probability of A belonging to a certain group B. Representativeness is basically 
used to assess the probability of situations concerning the relationship between 
different factors, such as A and B. The problem with representativeness is that it does 
not take all the factors that are relevant to assessing probability into account. 
The second heuristic, according to Tversky and Kahneman (1974), is called 
availability of instances or scenarios which basically means that people have a 
tendency to evaluate, for example, the risk of a middle-aged person having a heart 
attack based on the amount of heart attacks of their own acquaintances. Another 
example provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1974)  was that people might assess the 
probability of a business failing based on the risks and difficulties that can possibly be 
associated with the business. The problem with this approach is that the availability of 
instances or scenarios is affected by many other factors than just the frequency of 
instances or scenarios and the probability of these events occurring. 
The third heuristic proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is called adjustment 
and anchoring. People tend to use this heuristic to assess the probability of a future 
result by basing their assessment on an initial value that they adjust to come up with 
their assessment on the future result. Kahneman and Tversky argue that people have a 
tendency to underestimate the probability of failure when assessing the probability of 
a complex system. For example, Bar-Hillel (1973 via Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
completed a study where subjects were asked to choose between three different types 
of gambles: simple events, conjunctive events and disjunctive events. An example of 
a simple event was to draw a red marble from a bag where 50 percent of the marbles 
were red, and 50 percent were white. A conjunctive event was to, for example, draw a 
red marble seven consecutive times from a bag where 90 percent of the marbles were 
red, and 10 percent were white. A disjunctive event was to, for example, draw a red 
marble at least once in seven successive tries from a bag where 10 percent of the 
marbles were red, and 90 percent were white. The study revealed that subjects were 
more likely to bet on a conjunctive event than a simple event, although the probability 
of the conjunctive event was 0.48, and the probability of the simple event was 0.50. 
Subjects were also more likely to bet on a simple event than a disjunctive event, 
although the probability of the disjunctive event was 0.52. This implies that people are 
prone to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and underestimate the 
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probability of disjunctive events. The findings can be explained to be the cause of the 
anchoring bias, which will be described more in depth later on in this chapter. 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the three heuristics presented above are 
“highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable 
errors”. They argued that better decisions could be made in uncertain situations by 
understanding these heuristics as well as the biases to which these heuristics lead. 
3.2 Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory was created by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979. They 
argued that the expected utility theory that was used in the analysis of decision making 
under risk was incomplete. Kahneman and Tversky presented examples in their paper 
“Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk” that proved that people do not 
obey the axioms of the expected utility theory in all circumstances. For instance, one 
of the examples presented by Kahneman and Tversky was, whether a person would 
choose to take 450 of the Israeli currency or take a gamble, in which the person would 
have a 50% chance to win 1000 and a 50% chance to win nothing. It would be rational 
for the person to choose to take a gamble because the expected value of the gamble is: 
E(X) = 0.5 * 1000 + 0.5 * 0 = 500 > 450 
In other words, the expected value of the gamble is greater than that of taking 450. 
However, according to Kahneman and Tversky, people are more likely to choose to 
take 450. Rationality would suggest taking the gamble, but people have a tendency to 
fear losing 450 (which they do not actually lose) more than believing in the gamble, 
the expected value of which is 50 greater than 450. This is irrational. (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979.)  
The example presented above is, however, not adequate enough to explain prospect 
theory because different amounts of risk have varying effects on people’s investment 
decisions. Kahneman and Tversky presented several further examples demonstrating 
people’s attitudes towards varied amounts of risk regarding investment decisions, 
which will be discussed further in chapter 4 of this paper. 
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The disposition effect is a cognitive bias that describes how investors are prone to sell 
securities from which they have profited and to keep securities on which they have 
made a loss (Weber & Camerer, 1998). Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 26.)  demonstrated that “a person who has not made 
peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him 
otherwise.” In other words, the disposition effect is closely related with the findings of 
Tversky and Kahneman (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) that will be discussed more in 
depth in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
3.3 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is one of the most common cognitive biases affecting the rationality 
of people’s investment decisions. Overconfidence has been proven to cause people to 
overestimate their own knowledge and ability to control the outcome of situations and 
underestimate the risks associated with those situations. (Nofsinger, 2005, 10.)  
Investing requires the collecting and analyzing of information, as well as making 
decisions based on the collected information. However, this is not easy and so people 
have a tendency to misinterpret the accuracy of the information and overestimate their 
ability to analyze the collected information correctly. This kind of overconfident 
behavior can lead to irrational investment decisions, excessive risk-taking and 
eventually a negative return on investment (ROI). (Nofsinger, 2005, 11.)  
The negative effects resulting from overconfidence often start occurring after an 
investor has received positive results from their investments. After receiving a positive 
return on their investment, the investor starts believing more in their own opinion and 
judgement, and less on the impact of luck. Ultimately, this often results in the investor 
becoming overconfident, which means that the investor becomes prone to the different 
fallacies that may result from overconfidence. (Nofsinger, 2005, 18.)   
There may, however, be a way to avoid overconfidence at least in certain situations. 
Fisher and Statman (2000) argued that overconfidence could be avoided by adjusting 
estimates of uncertain situations in such a way that the confidence intervals of the 
made estimates would reflect the level of knowledge of the decision-maker as 
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accurately as possible. In other words, the less the decision-maker knows about the 
subject of estimation, the less accurate of an estimate they should make. The estimate 
should be narrowed down to such a frame that the decision-maker would be confident 
that the correct answer would not be outside of the frame. 
3.4 Anchoring 
Investors are prone to fixate on certain prices of stocks, which are called reference 
points. Fixating on these reference points is in the core of the anchoring bias because 
people base their judgement, whether they experience a win or a loss on their 
investment, on the specific reference points. These points are, however, merely created 
by investors, as they are not based on any scientific evidence, but rather on what prices 
the investors have seen the stocks reaching. (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002) For example, 
an investor may have seen the price of a stock fluctuating between 25 US dollars and 
35 US dollars. In this case, the investor starts treating 25 US dollars and 35 US dollars 
as benchmarks as they are making judgements on how successful their investment has 
been. 
The anchoring bias was originally introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who 
explained that people have a tendency of estimating a certain value based on an initial 
value that has been presented to them. In other words, the estimates people make end 
up being relatively close to the initial value, or anchor, that has been presented to them 
before making the estimate. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) defined this exact 
occurrence as the anchoring bias. 
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) later described that numerical estimates made by 
people end up being close to an anchor, which is the initial value, that they have been 
caused to consider before making the estimate. They called this the anchoring effect. 
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4 STUDIES AND DISCUSSION 
The third chapter of this thesis introduced the concept of prospect theory by describing 
the irrationalities that emerge in the decision-making processes of investors when 
deciding upon choosing between a gamble or a certain gain. The expected value of 
choosing the gamble proved to be higher than the certain profit, but the majority of 
people would irrationally avoid the gamble and take the certain gain. Why is this? 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explained that the irrational behavior occurs due to a 
reference point that people consider when making a decision. The reference point can 
be, for example, the status quo or the amount of total assets of the person making the 
decision. The reference point is an important factor regarding the outcome of the 
decision, as it alters the investment behavior of the person making the decision 
according to the relevant reference point, which implies that the person making the 
decision becomes risk-averse or risk-taking depending on the reference point in 
question. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) indicated that, according to prospect theory, making a 
decision includes two phases: First, the decision-maker uses a concept called framing 
to gather all the necessary materials and information that are necessary to be able to 
make a decision on the matter. Following the first phase, the decision-maker uses what 
is known as valuation to give value to the various options regarding the decision, and 
makes a decision based on the determined valuation. 
The disposition effect is a cognitive bias that makes people risk-averse when their 
investment has increased in value and risk-taking when the value of their investment 
has decreased. In other words, people tend to sell, for example, their shares of stock 
when they would make a profit from selling the shares, and hold on to their shares if 
selling the shares would make them suffer a loss. (Weber & Camerer, 1998) This 
implies that people are not consistent regarding their attitudes towards risk. 
Furthermore, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) stated that people have a tendency to 
evaluate the risk of an uncertain choice differently when the options regarding the 
choice are presented as gains or losses. This is a cognitive bias called the framing 
effect. 
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Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) further demonstrated that the way a choice is presented 
to people has a significant effect on the decisions they end up making. The study 
showed that the median estimates people made when they were asked to guess, for 
example, the height of Mount Everest or the population of Chicago, were greatly 
varying on every question because people were given different initial values, or 
anchors, before they were asked to make the estimates. The study emphasized the 
validity of the anchoring effect because the estimates people made were clearly 
affected by the initial value that was presented to them. The study also showed that the 
anchors subjects were given beforehand seemed to have an effect on the level of 
confidence that they had regarding making the estimate; subjects seemed to believe 
that the anchors presented to them had value regarding their decision-making. 
However, the amount of knowledge that subjects had before they were presented with 
an initial value had no distinguishable effects in people’s susceptibility to the 
anchoring effect. 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) stated that the decision-making of investors appears to be 
affected by the familiarity and ambiguity of different possible investment decisions. 
For example, people seem to be more willing to invest in the stock market of their own 
country than in a foreign market index even though investing in the index would be 
less risky. This is due to the perception of investors that investing in the foreign index 
would be more ambiguous or less familiar than investing in the national stock market. 
Odean (1999) described that selling investments is greatly related with the anchoring 
effect. In other words, people have a tendency to base their decision to sell their 
investments more on what has happened in the past than what is predicted to happen 
in the future. This implies that investors are prone to base their prediction of the future 
on the past, which is irrational. Odean (1999) further stated that investors consider 
their investments profitable or not profitable based on a certain reference point or 
break-even point; if the selling price of an investment is higher than its reference point, 
which could be, for example, the initial buying price of the investment, the investor 
considers it a gain, and if the selling price of the investment is lower than the reference 
point, the investor considers it a loss. However, Odean (1999) explained that a person 
who has, for example, bought a house for an initial price of 100 000 US dollars does 
not consider oneself breaking even if the house is sold for 100 000 US dollars when 
the value of the house is estimated to be 200 000 US dollars at the time of selling. In 
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other words, investors do not consider different reference points accurate in certain 
situations when the status quo is changing rapidly. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
People act according to bounded rationality because people do not know everything. 
Uncertainty is present in every investment decision because the future is unknown. As 
people, we are not fond of uncertainty, but on the contrary we despise it and we want 
to get rid of it. This means that we get the urge to fill the lack of certainty with an 
ersatz that gives us a feeling of security, as if we would know what the outcome of an 
uncertain situation will be. This kind of thinking leads us to stray from the path of 
rationality into the realm of irrationality and heuristics. 
Heuristics provide us an illusion of certainty; they make us feel that we are in control 
of the future, and that we know what the outcome of an uncertain situation will be 
when this is truly not the case. Although heuristics can be used to come up with 
relatively accurate estimates of uncertain situations, they are not consistent, and they 
will ultimately provide us erroneous results. However, people do not understand this, 
as the seemingly accurate estimates give people a sense of validity and legitimacy 
about using heuristics. This leads to people using heuristics always when faced with 
uncertainty, and eventually it becomes a habit. This habit of using heuristics leads to 
people having cognitive biases when assessing uncertainty. 
Cognitive biases cause systematic irrational behavior in people when they are faced 
with uncertainty and risk. These biases differ from each other but the principle in each 
one is the same: people base their estimates of uncertain situations on non-scientific 
principles, and so they are bound to not make the best possible choices when 
evaluating options of uncertain choices; The disposition effect causes investors to sell 
investments too early and hold on to investments for too long, the anchoring bias 
causes people to predict the future based on the past and overconfidence makes people 
neglect facts and make decisions only based on their own intuition and know-how. 
The problem with cognitive biases seems to be that people do not even realize that 
they are behaving irrationally and according to various cognitive biases. This implies 
that the problem could only be solved if people could avoid behaving according to the 
cognitive biases in the first place, and so the solution to the problem should be found 
by observing the cause of the cognitive biases: heuristics. Cognitive biases appear to 
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be further developed forms of different heuristics, which implies that the process that 
ultimately leads to cognitive biases can be reverse engineered in order to find the root 
cause of cognitive biases. As stated previously, heuristics lead to cognitive biases, but 
why do heuristics exist? They exist because people are not perfectly rational beings; 
nobody knows everything about everything, and so people use their intuition to make 
the feeling of uncertainty disappear. Uncertainty, in this case, means the uncomfortable 
feeling of not knowing something regarding a decision, choice or prediction. However, 
using one’s intuition is irrational, and this is where the problems begin; people start 
using heuristics because their intuition tells them that it is a smart move to make. Then 
people see that heuristics provide them fairly accurate results regarding their decision, 
choice or prediction, and they start believing that using heuristics is rational. However, 
heuristics are neither consistent nor do they provide the best possible results, and so it 
is, in fact, irrational to use them. Nevertheless, people use them because they believe 
that it is rational. Once people lean on heuristics for long enough, using them becomes 
a habit, and eventually these heuristics become cognitive biases, which means that 
people behave irrationally on a consistent basis, and so they are continuously not 
making the best possible choices, which implies that at least some results are bound to 
be adverse. 
Investing has a lot to do with acting rationally and perceiving different amounts of 
risk. However, the existence of cognitive biases can provide investors more or less 
confusing results. This is, because investors believe that they are making rational 
decisions day in day out when they are, in fact, behaving irrationally regarding every 
single investment decision that they are making, and they do not even realize it. 
Because of this, investors end up pondering the negative results that they are getting 
from their investments, and they will most likely not figure out the root cause of their 
negative results by themselves. Investors should therefore be informed that the belief 
that they have regarding the rationality of heuristics is a fallacy. 
Further research should focus on finding out ways to make people feel comfortable 
while dealing with uncertainty because uncertainty is what seems to drive people to 
behave irrationally. People cannot, at least for now, know everything about everything, 
and so irrational behavior cannot be eliminated. Because of this, research should focus 
on getting rid of the irrational coping mechanisms that people use to deal with 
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uncertainty so that people would attempt to make as rational decisions as they can in 
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